We test the hypothesis that insider trading impairs market liquidity, by analyzing intraday trades and quotes around 1,497 IPO lockup expirations in the period 1995-1999. We find that, while lockup expirations are associated with considerable insider trading for some IPO firms, they have little effect on effective spreads. By contrast, two other liquidity measures, quote depth and trading activity, improve substantially. In the 23 percent of lockup expirations where insiders disclose share sales, spreads actually decline. These findings indicate that a large body of well-informed, blockholding insider traders can enter a market from which they had previously been absent, and substantially change trading volume and share price, without impairing market liquidity.
Introduction
Insider trading is legally restricted in the U.S. and most other Western countries (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2001) ).
1 Many U.S. firms supplement these laws with additional private restrictions (Bettis, Cole and Lemmon (2000) ). These restrictions are justified partly by the hypothesis that insider trading creates a lemons problem that impairs market liquidity. This prediction flows from standard asymmetric information models (e.g., Copeland and Galai (1983) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985) , Leland (1992) ), as well as from Saar's (2001) model of demand uncertainty.
We test the hypothesis that insider trading impairs market liquidity, by analyzing a comprehensive sample of 1,497 IPO lockup expirations in the period 1995 -1999 expirations are an attractive venue for testing information asymmetry models, as they mark the abrupt, pre-announced, large-scale entry of informed, blockholding insider traders into the equity markets for young, growth firms with high potential for information asymmetry. In our sample, 23 percent of lockup expirations are followed by disclosure of insider selling, usually by officers and directors. This represents only a lower bound on post-expiration insider selling, as some sales are not disclosed. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find only small and temporary increases in the effective bid-ask spread (on the order of three percent of the spread width) lasting less than a week. We find no long-term change in effective spreads, and measures of market depth and trading activity improve substantially. More detailed tests fail to reveal signs of increased 1 In the U.S., trading on the basis of "material, non-public information" is banned under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 16 of the Act bans short selling by "Insiders" (officers, directors, and ten percent blockholders), allows the firm to recover any profits that insiders make on positions held for less than six months (the short-swing rule), and requires insiders to disclose their trades on Form 4 no later than the tenth day of the following month.
information asymmetry or of hidden liquidity impairments that are masked by the benefit of increasing the number of tradable shares. For the 23 percent of our sample firms that disclose insider trading, we find that spreads actually decline. Overall, lockup expirations seem to improve market liquidity.
We argue that the liquidity changes around lockup expirations represent an upper bound on the liquidity impairment due to insider trading in more typical periods. Thus we conclude that, under most circumstances, liquidity is not impaired by insider trading. Perhaps the simplest explanation for our result is that expected losses to insiders are minor compared with the other costs of trading. A practical implication is that market liquidity probably cannot be improved by strengthening the current legal restrictions on insider trading, either with stricter laws or by adopting additional voluntary constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview of lockup agreements, develops our testable hypotheses, and briefly discusses prior literature. Section 3 describes our data and methods. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 concludes.
Discussion
Nearly all IPOs feature lockup agreements: contracts between underwriters and the pre-IPO shareholders that bar share sales for a specified period after the IPO, usually six months.
Typically, the locked-up shares constitute two thirds of the public float, and more than 80 percent of the locked-up shares are owned by insiders. For an analysis of the terms of lockups, see Brav and Gompers (2002) .
Bradley, Jordan, Roten and Yi (2001) , Field and Hanka (2001) , and Ofek and Richardson (2000) find that lockup expirations result in a permanent, 40 percent increase in trading volume, and statistically significant stock price declines of about 1.5 percent. Field and Hanka (2001) find little change in quoted, closing spreads. These results do not suggest a decline in liquidity, but can be dismissed as showing only that liquidity cannot be summarized by volume and closing quotes. Market makers do not expect to trade at their closing quotes, and for Nasdaq firms (most IPOs) the quoted spread is typically not offered by any single individual, but is rather a composite of the bid and ask from two different market makers that are each quoting wider spreads. Alternatively, lockup expirations may result in no net change in liquidity because the increase in asymmetric information costs is obscured by the liquidity benefits from increased trading volume. Here we address these issues by looking at better measures of liquidity and depth.
Lockup expirations have several nice attributes that permit clean empirical tests. The expiration event is visually obvious in time series plots of volume and price, so there is little ambiguity about the relevant event date. The lockup period is largely standardized at 180 days following the IPO, so the timing of the expiration is relatively exogenous for any given firm and does not systematically coincide with other events like earnings announcements. The lockup applies only to insider sales and not to purchases, so its expiration should produce distinctive, asymmetric changes in bid-side and ask-side depth. Finally, lockup expirations are common enough that we can construct a large sample of relatively independent events.
Who actually sells shares around lockup expirations?
Field and Hanka (2001) show that locked-up shares are divided roughly evenly among executives, venture capitalists, and other blockholders. When the lockup expires, these wellinformed insiders are suddenly freed to sell their shares, subject to the volume constraints of Rule 144. 2 Under SEC Rule 16(a), all officers, directors, and ten percent blockholders are required to disclose their trades via Form 4 no later than the tenth day of the month after the transaction. Examining these disclosures for the period around lockup expirations, we find that 23 percent of firms report insider sales in the month after the lockup expiration, and most of the sales are by insiders that one would expect to be well informed. For example, executives (e.g.,
Chairman of the board, CEO, President, Officers and Directors, and other Officers) account for about two thirds of the insider sellers and one third of the shares sold. Most of the remainder of insider sales comes from non-executive directors of the firm.
Issues that insiders face around lockup expirations
Insider sales may be categorized as either diversification trades or as information trades, depending on whether the seller is motivated primarily by a desire to convert shares into cash, or by a private belief that the shares are overvalued. After lockup expirations we expect substantial diversification selling, because the founders and early investors often have a large fraction of their personal wealth tied up in the firm. We also expect substantial information selling, because the expiration is the insiders' first opportunity to sell shares without advance disclosure and hence is their first opportunity to act on their private beliefs about the firm's true value without bearing the full cost of any price declines resulting from disclosure of their trades. Furthermore, in the period immediately following a lockup expiration it will be uniquely difficult to prosecute insiders for illegal, information-based selling, as the information-motivated sellers cannot be distinguished from the liquidity-motivated sellers.
Liquidity theories and hypotheses
In standard asymmetric information models, risk-neutral competitive market makers trade with both informed and uninformed traders. Informed traders impose losses on the market maker, who compensates by widening the spread or reducing quote depth. See, for example, Copeland and Galai (1983) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985), and Leland (1992) .
These types of models apply in the context of lockup expirations. The shareholders affected by the lockup (the founders and early investors) are probably better informed than other investors, particularly since IPO firms tend to be young firms whose value consists mainly of intangible growth opportunities. More formally, in most models a trader is "informed" if and only if his trades tend to foreshadow subsequent price changes. By this definition, the insiders who trade after lockup expirations seem to be informed, as their trades (as subsequently disclosed to the SEC) are associated with economically and statistically significant drops in share price.
3
In these asymmetric information models, insiders' diversification trading is not distinguishable from other non-information trading. Alternatively, Saars' (2001) demand uncertainty model predicts that diversification trading can impair liquidity. The idea is that an insider sell order may foreshadow a sustained insider selling campaign that will eventually increase the supply of shares enough to depress the price. If so, then market makers will tend to regret buying from insiders. We expect this mechanism to operate with unusual force in our sample, as the lockup expiration marks the release of a substantial pent up supply of shares, typically two thirds of the total float. Unfortunately, as Saar (2001) 
Related literature on liquidity consequences of insider trading
This paper is closely related to the growing literature on the empirical relation between insider trading and market liquidity. Cornell and Sirri (1992) examine insider trading around Anheuser Busch's tender offer for Campbell Taggart, using ex post court records to identify insider trades and conclude that trading volume and liquidity increased when insiders were active. Bettis, Cole and Lemmon (2000) examine a sample of 284 firms whose internal policies restrict insider trading and find that effective spreads increase by about two basis points (or 0.02 percent of share price) during "trading windows" when insiders are allowed to trade. Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) examine earnings and dividend announcements and find that spreads widen only around unusual earnings announcements: those that are separated from a previous announcement by more than ten days but less than thirty days. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) use intraday data and find evidence that spreads widen around earnings announcements, especially in the minutes immediately prior to the announcement, but they express doubt about whether the resulting increase in trading costs is economically significant. Of course, liquidity is only one component of a broader debate on the merits of insider trading. A good overview of this debate can be found in Leland (1992).
Data and Methods

Data
Our initial sample is all IPOs in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database, in the period 1995-1999. For a firm to be included in the sample, we require at least three months of Trade and Quote (TAQ) data (obtained from the NYSE) both prior to and after the expiration day. Thus, the earliest expiration day for our sample firm is April 1995, and the latest expiration date is June 1999. (We have TAQ data though September 1999.) We exclude carveouts, stocks with issue price below $5, REITs, ADRs, unit offers, and firms that conduct a seasoned equity offer before the lockup expires (seasoned offer dates are also from SDC). These exclusions leave a potential sample of 1,534 firms. For each firm, we obtain a complete record of trades and quotes for the period from 30 days before the lockup expiration to 30 days after.
We apply standard screens to eliminate trades and quotes flagged as opening, non-standard delivery trades, as well as all Best Bid/Offer (BBO) ineligible quotes. BBO-ineligible quotes are closing quotations, trading halts, pre-opening indications, and non-firm quotations. Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we apply more stringent screens for trading activity. After excluding 37 firms that have fewer than ten days with valid TAQ data in either the pre-or postexpiration windows, we are left with a final sample of 1,497 firms.
An attractive feature of lockup expirations is that they are relatively exogenous events, not systematically timed to coincide with confounding events like earnings announcements. To verify this claim we plotted the frequency of earnings announcements around our sample expiration days (results not reported; data from Dow Jones and First Call). We found no pattern other than a weekly seasonal. (Lockup expirations tend to be on Mondays, while earnings announcements are most common on Tuesday.) We also replicate our main tests in the subsamples with and without earnings announcements and find qualitatively similar results. 
Sample Characteristics
Insider Sales
For all our sample firms, we collect SEC Form 4 disclosures for insider sales in the thirty-day period immediately following lockup expiration. About 23 percent of firms disclose insider sales in the month after lockup expiration. Summary statistics are presented in Table 2 and indicate that lockup expirations are followed by substantial share sales from insiders that we expect to be well informed. When executives sell after the lockup expiration, they tend to sell substantial amounts.
The average sale by the Chairman of the Board is over $3.5 million, while the median sale is almost one million dollars. For the CEO, the average sale is also over $3.5 million, with a median of over half a million dollars. For other officers who are also directors, the average sale is about $2.3 million (median $360,000.) Sales by directors who are not officers of the firm are larger, particularly for venture capitalists, who sell about $13 million on average (median $2.5 million.)
The last three columns of Table 2 show the distribution of the upper bound of individual trade sizes as reported to the SEC. These numbers are probably overstated, as insiders may use a single Form 4 to report aggregated sales over short periods. Most individual sales are relatively small and hence are not likely to be negotiated block sale transactions. The one exception may be sales reported by venture capitalists, which are substantially larger than other insider sales, but we cannot tell whether these indicate block trades or aggregations of many small trades.
Methods
Measuring the bid-ask spread
We compute several measures of bid-ask spreads. The quoted spread is defined as the difference between the bid and ask, while the relative quoted spread is defined as the quoted spread divided by the quote midpoint. The effective spread is defined as twice the absolute difference between the transaction price and the midpoint of the prevailing quoted spread. Most of our tests will focus on the relative effective spread (the effective spread expressed as a percentage of the quote midpoint), which we judge to be the best single measure of trading costs when both spread and share price may change concurrently.
For each firm, we compute the daily average spread for each day in the pre-and postexpiration windows, take the mean of the thirty daily averages, then compute the percentage difference between the means in the pre-and post-expiration windows. Our univariate tests measure the cross-sectional mean and median of these 1,497 firm-level percentage changes.
While most of our results are presented for the event window [-30 ,+30], we also conducted our tests with the window [-60,+60] and obtained qualitatively similar results.
Measuring market depth and trading activity
We compute several measures of market depth and trading activity. Ask depth is defined as the number of shares offered for sale at the ask price. Bid depth is defined similarly. Average number of shares per transaction, average number of daily transactions, and average daily volume are defined in the obvious manner. The depth-to-spread ratio, a measure of net improvement in liquidity, is defined as the sum of the bid and ask depth divided by the quoted relative spread. These measures are averaged over firms, days, and quote updates in the same manner as spreads are averaged.
Decomposing the spread
We apply a standard decomposition of the spread into an asymmetric information component, θ, and a fixed-cost component, φ, using the decomposition model described in
Madhaven, Richardson and Roomans (1997) , hereafter MMR. Formally, intraday price changes are assumed to follow:
where p t is the transaction price at time t, and x t is a trade-direction indicator that takes a value of 1 if the trade is buyer-initiated, -1 if the trade is seller-initiated, and 0 if the trade is a cross. The indicator variable is obtained using the inference procedure suggested by Lee and Ready (1991) . The trade is assumed to be seller initiated if the price is below the spread midpoint, buyer-initiated if the price is above the midpoint, and a cross if the trade is at the midpoint. Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000) find that this procedure works well for Nasdaq stocks. We also try an alternative inference procedure suggested by Ellis et al, and find qualitatively similar results.
Results
Post-expiration changes in spreads and depth
We also examine daily percentage deviations from the pre-expiration mean over the [-30,-6 ] period (results not shown). We find that relative effective spreads widen by 3-4 percent in the period [-2,+5] but then return to their pre-expiration levels. The temporary widening of the effective spread has small magnitude but is statistically significant. Figure 3 presents the time series of quote depth, an additional measure of liquidity.
Contrary to our hypothesis, quote depth trends upward after the lockup expiration. We expect that the results may depend on the exchange mechanism. Our sample is dominated by Nasdaq firms (1,274 firms), with only 223 (15 percent) being traded on the NYSE.
In unreported tests we find no statistically significant long-term spread changes in either the NYSE or Nasdaq subsamples.
While we see no clear changes in spreads, Table 3 shows clear increases in several measures of depth. The mean change in quote depth is about +22 percent (median of four percent), and the mean change in the depth-to-spread ratio is +27 percent (median of 10 percent).
Contrary to our hypothesis, bid-side quote depth does not decline relative to ask-side quote depth. Finally, the last rows of Table 3 show that, consistent with a general increase in liquidity, the post-expiration increase in trading volume is due to increases in both trade size and number of trades.
Changes in the asymmetric information component of the spread
Here we test the hypothesis that lockup expirations widen the asymmetric information component of the spread but not the fixed component. Table 4 presents our spread decomposition estimates for the thirty-day pre-and post-expiration periods. The coefficients are reasonable in the sense that they are similar to those reported elsewhere, e.g., in Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997), Glosten and Harris (1988) , and Madhaven, Richardson and Roomans (1997).
Our detailed analysis of firm-level estimation results reveals that the MRR model fits the data similarly well during both the pre-and post-expiration periods. Table 4 
about here
The main result is that the asymmetric information component, θ, does not change after the lockup expires. In the post-expiration period, the mean fitted value of θ is 2.41 cents per share, virtually identical to the 2.40 cents in the pre-expiration period. The difference is not statistically significant. The fixed cost component, φ, declines from 12.03 cents to 11.57 cents, a statistically insignificant reduction of 0.46 cents. The time series of abnormal effective spreads suggests that the short-term effects of the lockup expiration are larger than the long-term effects.
To test whether there is a significant short-term increase in asymmetric information costs, we also estimate the model in the period [+1,+10]. The results show a slightly increased asymmetric information component and slightly reduced fixed-cost component, consistent with the changes one would predict from simultaneous increases in insider trading and total trading volume.
However, once again, the change in the asymmetric information component has small magnitude and is not statistically significant.
The relation between spread changes and trade size
We now test the hypothesis that post-expiration spread increases are concentrated in medium-sized trades. Table 5 shows pre-to post-expiration changes in relative effective spreads for various classes of trade size. The results generally indicate favorable liquidity changes for large trades relative to small trades. Contrary to our prediction, effective spreads for mediumsized trades (1,000-5,000 shares or 5,000-10,000 shares) actually decline relative to those for smaller or larger trades. The most pronounced difference is a median eight percent decline in the spreads on trades of 5,000-10,000 shares. Thus, the relation between trade size and spread changes does not support the hypothesis that effective spreads on medium-size trades widen relative to small or large trades. 
Multivariate tests
Spreads and quote depth are functions of share price, trading activity, trade size, and volatility, all of which are likely to change when the lockup expires. To test whether these confounding factors affect our results, we estimate multiple regression models of the relative effective spread and quote depth, with controls for price change, trading activity, and volatility (results not shown). The sample for this test includes two observations per firm: one observation for the mean of the 30-day pre-expiration period and another for the mean of the 30-day postexpiration period. The coefficients on all the control variables have the predicted signs and are highly significant. In the quote depth model, the coefficient on a post-expiration dummy implies a post-expiration depth increase of 60 shares, or 7.5 percent of the pre-expiration average quote depth of 800 shares. However, in the spreads model, the post-expiration effect is not statistically significant in any specification. (Details available on request.) Thus, we find substantial postexpiration increases in quote depth that are not explained by concurrent changes in price, volume and volatility, but we find no abnormal change in spreads.
The effects of price changes
The relative spread is known to be a declining function of share price, due to minimum tick size and other factors (Harris (1994) ). Prices tend to drop after lockup expirations, and in our multivariate spread model, the bulk of the explanatory power (39 percent of a maximum 43 percent) comes from the control for price changes. To investigate further, we partition the sample by the sign of the post-expiration price change. The results, shown in Table 6 , indicate that price changes and spread changes are strongly related. When prices decline, the relative effective spread widens by an average of 12 percent (median of six percent). Conversely, when prices rise, the relative effective spread narrows by an average of 10 percent (median of 12 percent). These changes are much larger than those we observe in the combined sample, and results for a subsample of firms with larger price changes are even more extreme. Among the 185 firms whose price increases more than 20 percent, fully 90 percent show narrower effective spreads. Conversely, spreads widen in 77 percent of the 192 firms whose price falls more than 20 percent. Thus, it appears that spread changes after lockup expirations are driven primarily by price changes. Table 6 about here
Insider Sales
To investigate more directly the effects of insider trading, we break our sample into two subsamples: those firms that report insider sales to the SEC via Form 4 (347 firms), and those firms that do not report insider sales (1,150 firms). Table 7 replicates our main results for these two subsamples. Gompers and Lerner (1998) ). Thus, it is possible for firms to experience insider sales, even though no SEC Form 4 disclosures are made. As a result, we cannot be confident that the firms listed in Table 7 as not reporting insider sales actually experienced no insider selling. Therefore, to identify a clean subsample of firms that we are certain had no disclosed (or undisclosed) insider selling, we handcollect ownership data from IPO prospectuses and subsequent proxy statements. Specifically, we compare the share ownership disclosed in the IPO prospectus with that disclosed in the first proxy statement after our event window. When the two documents indicate no reduction in the holdings of the pre-IPO shareholders, we conclude that no significant insider sales occurred in our event window.
Since this test is labor intensive, we limit our attention to a relatively small subsample.
We restrict the sample to the firms whose IPOs occurred after May, 1996, the first date for which we can obtain prospectus data. We then sort first by year and then by firm name, and select every fourth firm. This procedure yields a subsample of 246 firms, of which we could obtain usable data for 216.
A weakness of this test is that the prospectus and the proxy do not itemize all shareholdings, only those of officers, directors, and five percent blockholders, so we cannot track share sales by pre-IPO shareholders who are not insiders. On average, we are able to account for 84 percent of the total locked-up shares (median=93 percent). Our method may also miss an increase in the public float due to incentive shares that are received by insiders after the IPO and then sold at lockup expiration. However, such sales should be rare, as incentive shares typically do not vest for at least a year.
We find that, in 113 firms (52 percent), the pre-IPO shareholders did not sell any of their shares, and in another 15 firms (seven percent), their share sales amounted to less than 0.5 percent of the shares outstanding. Thus, in 128 firms (59 percent) insiders hang on to virtually all of their shares until at least the first proxy date after the expiration window, typically about a year after the IPO. For these firms, we can be reasonably certain that the publicly tradable float did not materially increase during our event window.
For the 128 firms with little or no insider selling, Table 8 presents the pre-to postexpiration changes in several measures of liquidity. Despite the relatively small sample, the statistical power of the tests is sufficient to reach some order-of-magnitude conclusions. The pre-to post-expiration changes in bid-ask spreads show the same ambiguous pattern that was observed in the full sample, with positive mean but negative median. The changes in quote depth have substantially positive mean and median. For all the measures of trading activity, the mean change is positive but the median change is small or negative, indicating that changes in trading activity are skewed. Overall these results indicate that the conclusions we draw from the broader sample are not driven by the increase in the tradable float due to insider sales. 
Conclusions
To test whether insider trading affects market liquidity, we analyze the liquidity changes around the expirations of 1,497 IPO lockup agreements in the period 1995-1999. Lockup expirations mark the sudden release of a near-total prohibition on insider selling, and represent the first occasion in which an extremely well informed group of blockholding insiders -the founders and early investors in a firm -can profit from their inside knowledge by selling their shares at the same price offered to non-insiders. Since lockup expirations typically occur in high-growth firms with a limited public history, the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is potentially severe. Empirically, lockup expirations are significant events, resulting in large, sudden changes in price and trading volume.
Analyzing SEC disclosures, we find that lockup expirations result in substantial selling by officers and directors. However, when we compare the periods before and after lockup expiration, we find only small and temporary increases in the effective bid-ask spread, on the order of 3-4 percent of the spread, or about 0.12 percent of share price, lasting about a week.
Over longer horizons we find no significant increase in spreads, and what spread changes we do observe seem to be driven by price changes. Quote depth, average trade size and number of trades per day all increase substantially. In the 23 percent of firms where insiders disclose share sales, spreads actually decline. More detailed tests reveal no increase in the adverse selection component of the spread and no evidence of increased asymmetric information costs that might be masked by the general increase in trading activity. Overall, contrary to predictions of both the asymmetric information and demand uncertainty models, lockup expirations seem to improve liquidity.
The simplest interpretation for this result is that expected losses due to insider trading are small relative to the other costs of making a market and hence have little effect on spreads and quote depth. A practical implication of this result is that liquidity probably cannot be improved by strengthening the current legal restrictions on insider trading, or by supplementing them with self-imposed constraints.
Future research might further investigate the impact of insider trading on market liquidity. Under current laws, the insiders in our sample are free to trade on the basis of their general opinions about the firm's quality and valuation, but they may be reluctant to trade on the basis of their specific knowledge of impending events that might trigger large price changes and subsequent SEC investigation (Muelbroek (1992) ). Future research could test whether this distinction is important, by examining the liquidity changes around lockup expirations or other significant events in countries and time periods in which insider trading is not regulated. The sample is 1,497 U.S. lockup expirations in the period 1995 through 1999. Pre-lockup variables are measured in the 30-day period before lockup expiration. Issue value is the amount raised (in millions) in the offering. The effective spread is calculated as 2×| P t -M t |, where P t is the transaction price at time t and M t is the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes in effect at time t. Quoted depth is the average of the bid-side and ask-side quote depth. Effective and quoted spreads are measured in pennies per share; relative effective and relative quoted spreads are measured as a percentage of the quote midpoint. 
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